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I. INTRODUCTION
Ten years after California amended its constitution to prohibit
affirmative action1 and more than a year after the United States Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1,2 California school districts and advocates for
school desegregation find themselves navigating along three different legal
streams in trying to address the persistence of racial isolation in public
schools. Applied or analyzed separately, these streams may leave the
impression that public schools in California no longer operate under a state
constitutional mandate to reduce racial segregation, or that it is
unconstitutional for school districts to enact race conscious policies to further
that objective. Looked at together, however, these seemingly separate
doctrines allow us to reach the conclusion that the goal of reducing racial
isolation is required, and race conscious measures of achieving this goal are
permissible.
This Article begins by analyzing the cases that make up each of these
streams, and the failure, for the most part, to integrate them. The first body of
law deals with California's constitutional right to education and the
obligation under the state constitution for public school districts to take steps
to remedy school segregation, including de facto segregation. This body of
law includes not only the duty to desegregate, but it also contains guidance
on methods and remedies available to school districts in their efforts to carry
out their desegregation obligations. Second, a 1996 amendment to the
California Constitution to prohibit affirmative action policies by state entities
(Proposition 209) has given rise to a series of cases interpreting the
amendment's ban on racial preferences and the continuing availability of
non-preferential race conscious policies. Third, lower courts have begun to
construe the application of Proposition 209 to efforts by K-12 school
districts to prevent racial segregation.
* Executive Director, Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity, &
Diversity.
1 See CAL. CONST. art I, § 31 (a).
2 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
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Finally, an important theoretical contribution made in the course of this
analysis is the conclusion that Proposition 1, which amended the California
Constitution to limit court ordered desegregation busing to Fourteenth
Amendment violations,3  and the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of that amendment in Crawford v. Board of Education of the
City of Los Angeles,4 align the scope of California's equal protection clause
with federal Fourteenth Amendment law. While the objective of
Proposition 1 at the time of its adoption was to limit state court ordered
school desegregation to instances of intentional discrimination in order to
outlaw busing, its unintended impact years later may be to require California
courts to rely on federal equal protection law when interpreting the
application of Proposition 209 in the public school context. Federal equal
protection law, most recently analyzed in Parents Involved,5 establishes a
definitional and doctrinal distinction between unlawful individual racial
classifications and preferences, and permissible race conscious policies or
practices whose aim is to reduce racial isolation in schools. The practical,
significant importance of reading Parents Involved together with Crawford v.
Board of Education of the City of Los Angeles ("Crawford f,,)6 and Crawford
v. Board of Education of the City of Los Angeles ("Crawford I/")7 is that
California's Constitution continues to require integrated public schools, and
state and federal equal protection law permits states to use race conscious
measures that do not implicate racial preferences.8
Several lower courts in California have made this distinction between
prohibited racial preferences and permissible race conscious measures in
upholding voluntary race conscious school integration or diversity policies in
the face of Proposition 209 challenges. 9 In reaching that conclusion they
have not relied on California's Constitution Article I Section 7(a)
(Proposition 1) mandate that school desegregation efforts be evaluated under
Fourteenth Amendment standards; however, in Parents Involved, the
3 See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
4 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
5 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
6 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976).
7 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
8 Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068 (Cal. 2000), is not
to the contrary. At issue was the application of Proposition 209 to a local contracting
ordinance, not public education, and the practices explicitly involved racial and gender
preferences. Id. at 1081-82.
9 See e.g., Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 30 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
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plurality's Fourteenth Amendment analysis draws a distinction between
unlawful racial classifications and permissible race conscious measures.
10
II. FIRST STREAM: CRA WFORD 1AND II-THE DUTY TO DESEGREGATE
AND THE APPLICATION OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT LAW TO THAT
DUTY
In Crawford v. Board of Education of Los Angeles," the California
Supreme Court held that California's constitution mandates that school
boards take reasonable and feasible affirmative steps that result in progress to
alleviate segregation, even if the segregation is de facto in origin and results
from a facially neutral policy. 12 When the case was filed in 1968, the Los
Angeles Unified School District was 50% white and 50% "minority."' 13
Despite this balance in the district's student population, a substantial number
of schools were either 90% or more white students or 90% or more minority
students. 14 The school district conceded that its schools were segregated; at
issue in the case was whether the duty to desegregate extended to de facto
segregation. 15 In an earlier case, Jackson v. Pasadena City School District,16
the court had held unanimously that de jure segregated education was a
violation of California's constitutional right to equal protection and due
process. 17 In extending its holding to de facto segregation the court reasoned
that the protracted litigation created by attempting to distinguish between de
facto and de jure systems would delay desegregation efforts throughout
California. 18 More importantly, the court stated that the legal distinction
between de facto and de jure had little significance for the students who
suffered the consequences of segregation. 19
In spite of the strong mandate issued by the court in the Crawford I case
and the Los Angeles Unified School District consent decree, over the years
California's affirmative constitutional obligation to desegregate has
experienced numerous setbacks. The biggest among them-at least until
Proposition 209 eliminated race conscious affrrmative action-was the 1979
10 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2751-52.
11 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976).
12 Id. at 35-36.
13 Id. at 32.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 33.
16 382 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1963).
17 Id. at 880-81.
18 551 P.2d at 41.
19 Id.
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amendment to the California Constitution (Proposition 1). As part of the
national backlash against busing and facilitated by California's initiative
process, the amendment outlawed busing and pupil reassignment with the
following language:
[N]o court of this state may impose upon the State of California or any
public entity, board, or official any obligation or responsibility with respect
to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to
remedy a specific violation by such party that would also constitute a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and (2) unless a federal court would be
permitted under federal decisional law to impose that obligation or
responsibility upon such party to remedy the specific violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 20
The proposition was introduced by State Senator Alan Robbin
(Democrat-Van Nuys), and was approved by only 17% of the California
electorate even though it passed with a 69% to 31% margin.21 The Supreme
Court upheld Proposition 1 on the grounds that it was not enacted with
discriminatory intent in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 Instead,
the Court held, it established a separate civil rights remedy for de facto
school segregation. 23 While the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford II
limited the remedies available to California courts to implement
desegregation, the Court also pointed out that California's Constitution
continued to place upon school boards a greater duty to desegregate than the
federal Fourteenth Amendment. 24
In spite of the protracted legal battle surrounding it, Proposition 1 ended
up being largely symbolic because by the time the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of California Proposition 1 and its ban on bussing in 1982,
the District was only 23.7% white. 25 In Los Angeles, like many other cities
around the country, white flight had become permanent and the window of
opportunity for successful integration presented by California's Constitution
and the strong legal precedent for desegregation was lost. Despite the claims
20 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
21 See Public Policy Institute of California, Special Elections in California,
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/jtf/JTFSpecialElectionsJTF.pdf (last visited Oct. 30,
2008).
22 Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of L.A., 458 U.S. 527, 545 (1982).
23 Id. at 542.
24 Id. at 535.
25 Id. at 530 n. 1.
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made by the initiative's proponents during the campaign of their commitment
to public education, white students never came back to the public schools. 26
The Crawford cases and their progeny illustrate the impact of Fourteenth
Amendment doctrine even when California courts are interpreting
California's Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment and its federal
interpretation, for better or worse, influences outcomes in California equal
protection disputes, particularly as applied to public education. More
concretely, for the desegregation issue at hand, Parents Involved and its
Fourteenth Amendment interpretation will and should impact interpretations
of Proposition 209's ban on racial preferences.
III. SECOND STREAM: PROPOSITION 209 AND THE DISTINCTION
BETWEEN RACIAL PREFERENCES AND RACE CONSCIOUS MEASURES
In November 1996, the California electorate adopted Proposition 209,
which amended the California Constitution to provide that "[t]he state shall
not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or
group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting. '27
In the decade since the initiative went into effect, California municipalities
and state and local agencies have expressed widespread confusion about the
meaning and scope of Proposition 209. Legal proponents of Proposition 209
argue that Proposition 209 requires absolute color blindness, that is to say,
the mere goal or mention of diversity and integration by a state entity is a per
se violation of Article I Section 31 (a). 28 This interpretation of Proposition
209 ignores a basic legal tenet of standing. In this ideological legal world,
rather than require harm in order to establish a violation of Proposition 209,
the mere mention of race, gender, or ethnicity triggers a constitutional
violation.29
26 After the Supreme Court upheld Proposition 1, Robbins and other anti-busing
advocates promised to use voluntary measures to promote desegregation. Daniel
Martinez-HoSang, The Triumph of Racial Liberalism, the Demise of Racial Justice, in
RACE AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 288, 305 (Joseph E. Lowndes et al. eds.,
2008). Most of these programs were one way programs which sent kids of color to attend
schools in West Los Angeles or in the San Fernando Valley. Id.
27 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3 1(a).
28 "[T]he City must attempt race-neutral means before resorting to a race-conscious
program." Plaintiff's and Respondent's Opening Brief at 7, Coral Constr., Inc. v. San
Francisco, No. S152934 (Cal. 2007), available at 2007 WL 3390990. This is the very
argument that Justice Kennedy rejected in his opinion in Parents Involved. Parents
Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
29 For example, in American Civil Rights Foundation v. Berkeley Unified School
District, No. RG0692139, slip op (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 6, 2007), the attorney for the
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Despite the calls for color blindness, the law in California, even before
Parents Involved, was evolving towards a distinction between race conscious
policies that grant preferential treatment on the basis of race or ethnicity and
those that consider race either in their mission to broaden diversity or
alleviate racial isolation.
The California Supreme Court has only visited Proposition 209 once
since the law went into effect in 1996. In Hi- Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City
of San Jose,30 the California Supreme Court invalidated a public contracting
program that required city officials to reject "out of hand" all bids from
contractors who failed to either (a) utilize a specific percentage of minority
and women subcontractors or (b) undertake and document prescribed efforts
to include such subcontractors. 31 San Jose's program required outreach by
general contractors only to women-owned (WBE's) and minority-owned
businesses (MBE's) to inform them of sub-contracting opportunities. 32
Contractors that did not conduct this outreach were prevented from
submitting bids to the city.33 Given these facts, the California Supreme Court
defined Proposition 209's "preferential treatment" as "a giving of priority or
advantage to one person over others. 34
Likewise, other government policies struck down by lower courts as
impermissible under Proposition 209 have similarly had an element of
preferential treatment based on race or ethnicity. Proponents of a broad
definition of Proposition 209 that requires race blindness point to Crawford
v. Huntington Beach Union High School District35 as a case in which the
court struck down a race conscious program that did not grant a preference. 36
While they may be correct about the court's equivocation on the issue of
whether a cause of action under Proposition 209 requires an element of
preference, the facts of the case are not ambiguous and the district's
desegregation policy implicated racial preferences or disparate treatment.37
The school district's policy at issue established racial percentages for one of
plaintiff argued that including race and ethnicity as one of three measures in an
elementary student assignment was sufficient to violate Proposition 209. See Pacific
Legal Foundation, Featured Case: Battling Racial Discrimination by Public Entities,
http://community.pacificlegal.org/NETCOMMUNITY/page.aspx?pid=504&srcid=272
(last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
30 12 P.3d 1068 (Cal. 2000).
31 Id. at 1085.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 1082 (alteration omitted).
31 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
36 Id. at 97-98.
3 7 Id. at 102-03.
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its high schools, Westminster High, in order to prevent the
overrepresentation or underrepresentation of any one racial group in that
school.38 In order to achieve this goal, students could only transfer in or out
of a school if their transfer did not affect the racial percentage set by the
district.39 In practice this meant depending on the impact on diversity,
students of a certain race might be able to transfer in or out of Westminster
High, while students belonging to another racial group might not qualify for
a transfer. 40
The school district argued that the plan did not violate Proposition 209
because all students, regardless of what school they attended, participated in
the same educational programs. 41 The court rejected this substantive
argument and instead focused on what it viewed as impermissible racial
"balancing" that necessitated a process that classified students by race or
ethnicity.42 As if embarrassed by its rejection of the district's compelling
argument that the transfer policy achieved desegregation without causing
harm to its students, the court stressed towards the end of its decision that it
was not rejecting all integration plans or ignoring the evils of segregated
schools.43 It underscored this point by citing favorably decisions that uphold
the use of lotteries or magnet schools to reduce racial isolation-mechanisms
that do not make distinctions between individual students based on race or
ethnicity.44
In keeping with an interpretation of Proposition 209 that focuses on the
harm to individuals, another Court of Appeal held that California can have a
law that "involves race consciousness" if "it does not discriminate among
individuals by race and does not impose any burden or confer any benefit on
any particular racial group or groups." 45 In Sanchez, the defendant
challenged a California Election Code law that created a cause of action that
allowed challenges to electoral systems that resulted in vote dilution through
38 Id. at 97-98.
3 9 Id. at 102.
40 Id.
41 Crawford v. Huntington Beach Union High Sch. Dist., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 102
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
4 2 Id. at 98.
43 Id. at 104.
44Id.
45 Sanchez v. City of Modesto, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 821, 826, 838 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
(rejecting an equal protection challenge to the California Voting Rights Act of 2001,
which "gives a cause of action to members of any racial or ethnic group that can establish
that its members' votes are diluted though [sic] the combination of racially polarized
voting and an at-large election system").
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the combination of racial polarization and at-large elections. 46 They argued
that the statute's attention to racial polarization was a racial preference
prohibited by Proposition 209.47 The court rejected the challenge, holding the
law did not create a racial preference because any racial group could sue for
vote dilution under the 2001 law, and the statute's attention to race, i.e. the
fact that the law was explicit in its goal of preventing racial polarization and
vote dilution, did not automatically establish a "preference" as defined in Hi-
Voltage.48
Soon after the passage of Proposition 209, Ward Connerly, the public
face of Proposition 209 and of the opposition to affirmative action, sued the
state of California to halt a large set of state programs.49 The programs
included state guidelines for soliciting diverse contractors, community
college hiring polices, goals and timetables established by various
government agencies, and data collections policies used to track diversity in
hiring and contracting. 50 The California Court of Appeal for the Third
District struck down programs that it considered to create quotas and
preferences, quoting extensively from the California Supreme Court's
decision in Hi-Voltage.51 It left in place, however, the following programs
that it held did not discriminate or grant preferential treatment within the
meaning of Proposition 209:
* making formal commitments to diversity; 52
* collecting and reporting data concerning the participation of women
and minorities; 53 and
* using such information to restructure selection processes to ensure
that no groups are unfairly excluded.54
The same court elaborated that public entities may-and in some cases
must-use race- and gender-conscious data to flag and eliminate
exclusionary practices. 55 In the employment context, for example, the
4 6 Id. at 825-26.
47 Id. at 826.
48 Id. at 841-42.
49 See Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal Rptr. 2d 5, 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 16, 26-27.
52 Id. at 38.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 39.
55 Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal Rptr. 2d 5, 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
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Connerly court made clear that such information can highlight the need to
restructure the selection process. 56 The court noted:
Such a determination may indicate the need for further inquiry to ascertain
whether there has been specific, prior discrimination in hiring practices. It
may indicate the need to evaluate applicable hiring criteria to ensure that
they are reasonably job-related and do not arbitrarily exclude members of
the underutilized group. And it may indicate the need for inclusive outreach
efforts to ensure that members of the underutilized group have equal
opportunity to seek employment with the affected department. 57
As another panel of the California Court of Appeal has stated,
Proposition 209 permits, and indeed encourages, public employers to
implement policies for "removing barriers to employment that may operate
to discriminate on the basis of race or ethnicity. ' '58 The distinction for the
Connerly court was in the fact that "the guarantee of equal protection is an
individual right."' 59 It was harder to argue that information gathering treads
on an individual's right to be free of discrimination.
IV. THIRD STREAM: INCLUSIVE EFFORTS TO ENSURE AN INTEGRATED
LEARNING ENVIRONMENT
While the California Supreme Court has yet to apply Proposition 209 in
the education context, lower courts that have visited the issue have drawn
upon many of the same principles outlined above to delineate the permissible
limits of race conscious student integration plans. In crucial respects, their
decisions anticipate Justice Kennedy's reasoning in Parents Involved that
drew a distinction between racial classifications of individuals which violate
the Fourteenth Amendment, and permissible race conscious policies designed
to reduce racial isolation that do not rely on preferences or classifications.
California's lower courts have interpreted Proposition 209 to allow racial
and ethnic diversity as a permissible educational goal and they have allowed
school districts to adopt diversity plans that set out to integrate their schools
as long as race of an individual student is not a determinative factor in
deciding acceptance into a particular school.
I discussed the first of the Proposition 209 voluntary integration cases,
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Cheresnik v. San Francisco, No. A098415, 2003 WL 1919111, at *11 (Cal. Ct.
App. Apr. 23, 2003).
59 Connerly, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 29-30.
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Crawford v. Huntington Beach Union High School District,60 above. There
the Court of Appeal invalidated a transfer policy that dictated a "one-for-one
same race exchange" because it was not "simply a race-conscious program
that seeks to provide students with equal educational opportunities," but a
"policy [that] creates different transfer criteria for students solely on the basis
of their race. 61
While opponents of affirmative action that aim for a broad application of
Proposition 209 argue that Huntington Beach stands for the proposition that
any race conscious policies meant to desegregate violate Proposition 209,
other subsequent decisions have underscored the narrowness of the court's
holding. School districts have prevailed in a trio of recent cases involving
voluntary desegregation plans that consider race and ethnicity as one of
several diversity factors. In ACRF,62 for example, the court upheld school
assignment plans that consider the racial makeup of the student's
neighborhood as one of several equally-weighted factors, no one of which is
determinative of any placement decision. In Capistrano,63 the court upheld
the consideration of neighborhood ethnic composition in setting school
attendance boundaries. In Avila v. Berkeley Unified School District,64 the
court upheld a "controlled choice" school assignment plan that considered a
student's race and ethnicity as one of several factors. 65
Moreover, some of these cases emphasize that California's Equal
Protection Clause imposes an obligation to alleviate school desegregation
regardless of its cause, and that Proposition 209 must be read in harmony
with this obligation rather than read to implicitly repeal the obligation.66
Along these lines, the California Court of Appeal has indicated that
Proposition 209 permits districts to use magnet schools to encourage the
movement of students "in a pattern that aids desegregation on a voluntary
60 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
61 Id. at 98, 102 (emphasis added).
62 Am. Civil Rights Found. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., No. RG0692139, slip op.
(Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 6, 2007).
63 Neighborhood Sch. for Our Kids v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., No.
05CC07288, slip op. at 6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2006) (unpublished minute order).
64 No. RG03-110397, 2004 WL 793295 (Cal. Super. Ct. April 6, 2004).
65 Id. at 3 (holding that "[tihe Court cannot conclude that any consideration of
race--one of several criteria-makes the Plan unconstitutional").
6 6 See ACRF, No. RG0692139, at 9-13; Avila, 2004 WL 793295, at *1 ("[S]chool
districts have a 'constitutional duty under state law to undertake reasonably feasible steps
to alleviate school segregation regardless of cause. In carrying out its duty [a school
district] may utilize any or all desegregation techniques ... ' (quoting Crawford v. Bd.




basis. '67 In keeping with the balance between the duty to desegregate and the
prohibition against racial preferences, another lower court held that
Proposition 209 does not forbid the provision of supplemental funding to
schools with substantial minority populations, provided that the district has
race-neutral reasons for such funding.68 For example, following the lifting of
a desegregation order, Proposition 209 does not prohibit districts from
providing transitional supplemental funding to preserve educational
programs at schools that were formerly identified as "racially isolated
minority" schools. 69
Finally, the Ninth Circuit has construed Huntington Beach very
narrowly, declaring that the decision does not even squarely control a policy
that forbids any transfer that would push the ratio of whites to nonwhites at
the destination school beyond a prescribed balance.70 In Friery v. Los
Angeles Unified School District, the court noted that such a policy "erects
both a minimum and a maximum applicable to each racial group, such that
the policy's macroscopic effect-keeping whites and nonwhites in balance-
touches both groups with equal force .. -71 The policy in Crawford, by
contrast, "operated only in one direction: it created a floor for whites and a
ceiling for nonwhites, but not the converse." 72
V. CONCLUSION
As these thoughtful court decisions show, neither the law nor public
policy considerations mandate absolute colorblindness and the illogical
results that follow from an overbroad reading of Proposition 209. Instead, it
is clear that careful consideration of race in California's public institutions is
not only still permitted, but sometimes necessary to secure equal opportunity
and a vibrant economy.
67 Crawford v. Huntington Beach Union High Sch. Dist., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 104
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 92 (1995)). See also
Hernandez v. Bd. of Educ. of Stockton Unified Sch. Dist., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 4 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004) ("Magnet programs provide a race neutral means to prevent racial or ethnic
isolation by providing educational choices for district students.").
68 Hernandez, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 12-13.
69 Id. at 13.
70 Friery v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 300 F.3d 1120, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2002).
71 Id. at 1123.
72 Id. at 1124. Whether Proposition 209 permits the Friery transfer policy remains
unresolved because the California Supreme Court denied the Ninth Circuit's request to
certify the question, and the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for the purpose of making a
determination of the plaintiffs standing. Friery v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 1146,
1150 (9th Cir. 2006).
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